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Abstract
In ‘Joint Action and Development’, Stephen Butterfill argues that if
several agents’ actions are driven by what he calls a “shared goal”—a
certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions
constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cog-
nitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the
potential to play a role in fostering their understanding of other minds.
Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose
means that are appropriate to realising a goal with others rather than
individually. By offering a counterexample, I show that the pattern
of goal-relations and expectations specified by Butterfill cannot play
this role. I then provide an appropriately conceptually and cognitively
undemanding amendment with which the account can be saved.
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1 Introduction
Stephen Butterfill (2012) asks what joint action could be given that it plays
a role in fostering children’s understanding of other minds. It could not be
action that is the outcome of what Bratman (1993) calls a ‘shared intention’.
To take part in such a shared intention, a child would need to have the
very understanding of other minds that we are supposing joint action to
foster. Butterfill therefore gives an account of a kind of joint action that
doesn’t depend on shared intention, and which could potentially facilitate
children’s understanding of others.1 By offering a counterexample, I show
that Butterfill’s account cannot quite play the role that he envisages for it.
I then provide an amendment with which the account can be saved.
According to Butterfill, several agents’ actions constitute a goal-directed
joint action if they are appropriately caused and coordinated by a certain
pattern of goal-relations and expectations. The pattern is characterised by
the following features, which are supposed to be collectively sufficient:
a. one goal, two or more agents —
there is a single goal, G, to which each agent’s actions are,
or will be, individually directed;
b. identification —
each agent can identify each of the other agents in a way that
doesn’t depend on knowledge of the goal or actions directed
to it;
1Other accounts that have been constructed with similar theoretical aims in view
include Deborah Tollefsen’s (2005) account of shared intention-in-action and Elisabeth
Pacherie’s (2013) team-agency account of shared intention.
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c. expectations about goal-directed actions —
on balance each agent expects each of the other agents she
can identify to perform an action directed to the goal; and
d. expectations about a common effect —
on balance each agent expects this goal to occur as a common
effect of all of their actions directed to the goal, her own and
the others’.
(Butterfill, 2012, p. 40)
These features do not require the agents to attribute mental states to each
other. The term ‘goal’ refers to an outcome that an action is directed to,
not to the content of an intention or other goal-directed state of the agent.
Hence, the features only require the agents to be able to recognise and con-
ceive of actions as directed to outcomes (Butterfill and Apperly, 2013; Csibra
and Gergely, 2007). This is not overly demanding for an account of a kind of
joint action that could play a role in fostering understanding of other minds
(Woodward, 1998; Carpenter et al., 1998; Behne et al., 2005). Furthermore,
the term ‘expectation’ here refers to a kind of belief-like state that develop-
mental psychologists take to control behaviours such as eye movements and
looking times. Such a state need not be about the future, and need not be a
full-blown belief.
Butterfill takes features (a) to (d) to specify a patten that can realise
a ‘shared goal’. This is Butterfill’s technical term for a psychological pat-
tern with the functional role of coordinating “plural activities”—activities in
which a single outcome G is satisfied as a common effect of the actions of
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several agents, each of which is individually directed to G. He illustrates this
idea as follows:
[...] Amin and Bertram each individually aim to put a large barrel
into a boat. Either of them could move the barrel into the boat
alone or their doing this could be a plural activity; the choice is
theirs. The sequence of activities Amin would need to perform
to put the barrel in the boat differs depending on whether he is
acting alone or with Bertram. Acting alone, Amin would position
himself so that the barrel and boat are in front of him, throw his
arms around the middle of barrel, raise it, tilt back and then push
up and forwards. If he chose to act with Bertram, Amin would
need to take an entirely different approach. It is this need that
shared goals answer.
(Butterfill, 2012, p. 38)
According to Butterfill, the pattern of goal-relations and expectations that
he specifies can play this functional role in part because features (c) and (d)
“are jointly equivalent to requiring that the each [sic] agent expects that she
and the other agents are engaged in a plural activity with goal G.” (2012,
p. 42)
Why must having a shared goal entail an expectation on each agent that
they are involved in a plural activity? Beyond enabling agents to choose
means appropriate for acting with others, perhaps it is needed for explaining
how shared goals could facilitate children’s understanding of others. The
following is not quite Butterfill’s thought, but it is in the spirit of a hypothesis
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he presents elsewhere (see Butterfill, 2013): If a child expects that it is
involved in a plural activity with an adult and if it knows which goal its
own actions are directed to, then the child would be licensed to infer that
unfamiliar actions performed by the adult are also directed to this goal. In
this way, having a shared goal with an adult could provide the child with a
framework for understanding unfamiliar actions and means (such as the use
of an unfamiliar tool with an unknown function, as suggested by Butterfill,
2013, pp. 854-5). However, it could only provide such a framework if it
ensures that the child expects that it is involved in a plural activity, that is,
if it ensures that the child expects that the other?s actions are directed to
the goal that its own actions are directed to.
Unfortunately, as I will now show, the pattern of expectations defined by
(a) to (e) cannot play the role that Butterfill intends it to play.
2 The counterexample
Consider Amin and Bertram, who each individually aim to put the large
barrel into the boat. Suppose that the large barrel is lying on its side in
front of Amin and Betram. Between them and the barrel stands a pillar
that blocks their view of the barrel’s mid-section. Now, suppose that each
is under the mistaken impression that there are two barrels, one to the left
and one to the right of the pillar. Each thinks that there is empty space
behind the pillar, rather than the barrel’s mid-section. Amin and Bertram
both represent the goal of Amin’s actions as “that the barrel visible on the
left side of the pillar is put into the boat”, and they both represent the goal
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of Bertram’s actions as “that the barrel visible on the right side of the pillar
is put into the boat”. As it happens, for the (single) barrel to drop into
the boat, it must be pushed through a heavy door that tilts back around a
horizontal pivoting axis. Each of Amin and Bertram expects that the door
will be pushed open as an effect of both their actions. As a consequence,
each expects the outcome “that the barrel visible on the left side of the pillar
is put into the boat” to occur as a common effect of their actions. Each also
expects the outcome “that the barrel visible on the right side of the pillar
is put into the boat” to occur as a common effect of their actions. These
expectations are all about a single outcome but they represent that outcome
under different “aspectual shapes” (Searle, 1992, p. 155) and this makes it
possible for each to mistakenly believe that there is no single goal toward
which all their actions are directed.
According to a reasonable interpretation of Butterfill’s account, Amin
and Bertram would here have a shared goal to put the barrel into the boat.
Feature (a) is present, since the actions of both are directed to the single
outcome G that the barrel is put into the boat. Feature (b) is also present,
since each of them is aware of the other’s presence; they can each see and hear
the other. Now, their expectations regarding their actions and the common
effect represent G under different aspects, but on a reasonable interpretation,
(c) and (d) do not fix the aspect under which G must be represented in
the agents’ expectations. Hence, that there is a single goal G such that
Amin expects his own actions to be directed to it and such that he expects
Bertram’s actions to be directed to it does not entail that Amin also expects
that there is a single goal G such that his own actions are directed to it and so
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are Bertram’s. Both Amin and Bertram can therefore expect that their own
and the other’s actions are directed to distinct goals, despite the presence of
features (a) to (d). Each of them expects that they are not engaged with the
other in plural activity. They are thus not in a position to choose means that
are appropriate to performing a plural activity rather than bringing about
some effect individually (for example, they could fail to appropriately choose
to push the barrel at the same time and from the most appropriate places).
The pattern (a) to (d) thus fails to play its assigned functional role. Hence,
this is a counterexample to a reasonable interpretation of Butterfill’s account.
3 Why the aspect shouldn’t be fixed
There is an interpretation of Butterfill’s account according to which the case
I have just described does get ruled out. On this interpretation, ‘the goal’
and ‘this goal’ in (c) and (d) refer to G represented under a certain fixed
aspect, so that features (c) and (d) are present only if each of the agents’
expectations represent G under that aspect. When read this way, features
(c) and (d) are not present in the case of Amin and Bertram. And on this
fixed-aspect interpretation, several agents could not have a shared goal while
failing to realise that there is a single goal that their actions, their own and
the others’, are all directed to. However, this constraint on how the agents
can represent G is too strong, and its introduction seems ad hoc.
Suppose that there is no pillar in the Amin and Bertram case and neither
of them is under the mistaken impression that their actions have distinct
goals. However, suppose that Bertram is blind. He thus represents the goal
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of his own and Amin’s actions as the outcome “that the barrel that I touched
previously, when standing over there, is put into the boat”. Amin’s sight re-
mains fine though, so he represents the goal of his own and Bertram’s actions
as “that the barrel visible over there is put into the boat”. Suppose further
that each of them expects this outcome to occur as a collective effect of their
actions and that it does occur in this way. On the fixed-aspect interpreta-
tion of conditions (a) to (d), Amin and Bertram would in this case not have
a shared goal. But why would the difference in how the agents represent
the single goal itself undermine their actions from constituting a joint action
driven by shared goals?2 Arguably, Butterfill’s account should accommodate
such a case. It would not be a counterexample to the account, since Butter-
fill’s features are not supposed to be necessary but only collectively sufficient.
Nevertheless, agents will often represent G under different aspects when en-
gaged in coordinated goal-directed joint action and the account would fail
to accommodate all such cases. This would clearly make Butterfill’s account
unsatisfactory.
So it appears that Butterfill’s account needs some constraint on under
what aspects the agents represent G. However, the only constraint that can
be read into the account is clearly too strong. At the same time, it is hard
to see what sort of other constraint on aspectual shape that could help here.
Consider Seumas Miller’s requirement that agents must aim at a single goal
(or end) “under more or less the same description” for their actions to con-
2Or consider the case of a guide dog and its blind owner walking to a supermarket
together. The dog and its owner probably represent the destination under very different
aspects, but this wouldn’t stop their walking from being a coordinated goal-directed joint
activity.
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stitute a joint action directed to that goal (2001, p. 58). For a constraint on
aspectual shape in this vein to rule out the counterexample but still accom-
modate the case of Amin and blind Bertram, it must, first, be the case that
“the barrel visible on the left side of the pillar is put into the boat” and “the
barrel visible on the right side of the pillar is put into the boat” are not more
or less the same aspectual shape (otherwise the counterexample isn’t ruled
out). Secondly, it must be the case that “the barrel that I touched previ-
ously, when standing over there, is put into the boat” and “the barrel visible
over there is put into the boat” are more or less the same aspectual shape
(otherwise, the case of Amin and blind Bertram is not accommodated). It
seems forlorn that there exists a metric of similarity for aspectual shapes that
would deliver these results. Note also that it is important for Butterfill that
his account doesn’t require agents to represent under which aspects others
(or themselves) represent G, at least if we take such a meta-representational
capacity to be part of what joint action is supposed to foster.
4 The missing feature
What Butterfill needs to rule out the counterexample I have presented, while
allowing agents to represent G under different aspects, is the following sur-
prisingly simple amendment:
e. expectations about a single goal —
each agent expects that G is a single goal to which all the
agents’ actions, her own and the others’, are directed.
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This feature is not present in the counterexample I presented, and it thus
successfully rules it out. Moreover, the feature can be present even if the
agents represent G very differently, as it doesn’t at all constrain under which
aspects the agents represent G. It thus allows that agents such as Amin
and blind Bertram be engaged in joint action driven by shared goals. The
feature also ensures that each agent expects that all the agents are involved
in a plural activity.
To rationally arrive at the expectation required by (e), must each agent
be able to represent and compare the aspects under which she and the other
agents represent G? If this was the case, then the feature would require
agents to attribute mental states to others, and it would thus be unsuitable
for an account of joint action that could foster children’s understanding of
other minds. One might think that if the agents represent the goal under
very different aspects, then their expectations about a single goal will be
undermined. However, this worry rests on a mistaken view of how agents
form beliefs about goals. If Amin and Betram are approaching the barrel
to put it into the boat, Amin’s expectation that there is single goal that
his own and Bertram’s actions are directed to need not be formed according
to a procedure of the following kind: Figure out under what aspect the
other agent represents the goal of her action; compare this aspect with the
aspect under which I represent the goal of my own action; and on the basis
of this comparison, judge whether or not there is a single goal that I and
the other are both representing. Perhaps there are rare cases where we do
something like this, but they are hardly typical. Rather, the basis for Amin’s
expectation might simply be cues like the following: that he and Bertram
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exchange glances with each other and toward the large barrel, that they
orient their postures and steps toward said barrel, that the barrel itself is
constructed in such a way that it can be conveniently pushed or lifted by
two individuals like Amin and Bertram, that they have moved barrels like
this together before, and so on. Generally, expectations about a single goal
might be formed on the basis of many different considerations, depending
on context and the type of joint action. Any meta-representing of under
which aspect others represent the goal G will be of secondary import, made
(if at all) after it has been established that G is a single goal to which all the
agents’ actions are directed.3
Feature (e) is thus congenial for Butterfill. It doesn’t introduce any de-
mand that participants be able to attribute mental states such as intentions
or beliefs to others. Nor does it require that agents judge that the goal of
her own action is identical to the goal of the others’ action. It is sufficient
that each agent recognises that there is a single goal G to which all their
actions are directed to. Indeed, evidence from developmental psychology
suggest that even infants are able to recognise that there is a single goal
to which the actions of two agents are directed (Henderson and Woodward,
2011; Henderson et al., 2013; Fawcett and Gredeba¨ck, 2013).4
At this point, someone might object that I have not considered an in-
terpretation of Butterfill’s account according to which (e) is already implied
by the presence of features (a) to (d). On this interpretation, ‘the goal’ and
3See Campbell (2011) and Moll & Meltzoff (2011) for an analogous point about the
relation between joint visual attention and visual perspective-taking.
4At least, this is a plausible lean interpretation of what the results of the experiments
in question show.
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‘this goal’ in (c) and (d) refer to G represented under a certain aspect that
is fixed for each agent—intra-agentially so to speak—but it is free to vary
between the agents. Features (c) and (d) would then be present only if for
each agent represents the goal G of their own action under the same aspect
as they represent the goal G of the others’ actions. Since same aspect implies
the same extension, feature (e) would always be present when (a) to (d) are
present. This intra-agential fixed-aspect interpretation is far from obvious
though, and settling on it would be a forced response to the example cases I
have presented. Feature (e) on the other hand, can be independently moti-
vated. It should be introduced because it articulates something that is at the
heart of an everyday notion of joint action, namely that it involves agents
acting in the belief or expectation that there is a single goal that all their
actions, their own and the others’, are directed to.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that Butterfill (2012) either fails to provide sufficient condi-
tions for shared goals, or else fails to accommodate clear cases of joint action
where agents represent the goal of the joint action under different aspects.
Fortunately, I have also provided an amendment that can save Butterfill’s
account. When agents have a shared goal, each expects that G is a single
goal to which all their actions, her own and the others’, are directed. Ap-
propriately for Butterfill’s account, this additional feature is cognitively and
conceptually undemanding.5
5Acknowledgements: First and foremost, I am grateful to Steve Butterfill for lucid and
constructive comments on a paper draft from which this piece descends. Helpful comments
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